ABSTRACT. The aim of this article is to explore the impact of commercial marketing on personal autonomy. Several philosophers argue that marketing conflicts with ideals of autonomy or, at best, is neutral to these ideals. After qualifying our concept of marketing and introducing the distinctions between (i) divergent and convergent marketing and (ii) being autonomous and acting autonomously, we demonstrate the heretofore unnoticed positive impact of marketing on autonomy. Specifically, we argue that (i) convergent marketing has a significant potential to reinforce autonomous action and (ii) divergent marketing has a significant potential to reinforce the state of being autonomous.
Introduction
The debate over the impact of marketing on personal autonomy predominantly concerns the degree to which marketing overrules autonomy. Commentators fall into two camps. The hardliners argue that marketing is hostile to autonomy and, more often than not, overrules the ability to develop and exercise personal autonomy (Barrett, 2000; Crisp, 1987; Raley, 2006; Sneddon, 2001) , whereas the challengers argue that marketing is, to a considerable extent, compatible with the exercise of autonomy (Arrington, 1982; Cunningham, 2003) . Both camps assume, however, that the impact of marketing on autonomy is negative or neutral, but never positive. In contrast, we argue that, under some circumstances, marketing can contribute positively to autonomous agency and the state of being autonomous.
First, we offer an initial clarification of the concepts of marketing and autonomy, which is essential to understanding the argument presented in this article. Later on, we provide a more detailed account of the concepts. According to the American Marketing Association (AMA, 2008) , marketing is the activity for creating, communicating, delivering, and exchanging offerings that have value for customers, clients, partners, and society at large. The AMAdefinition is clearly a normative one in that marketing is not necessarily a vehicle for offerings that have value for consumers. Marketing certainly may, and quite often does, have value for consumers, but not always. However, taken as a normative statement about marketing that we should try to achieve in practice, the definition proves to be very useful.
We limit our focus to strategic marketing communications that attempt to induce a desire or preference by linking a commercial product or a corporate organization to a symbolic value or set of symbolic values in the mind of the consumer (e.g., branding).
The discussions in this article refer to, and build on, analyses of advertisements, but the arguments apply to any kind of marketing communication aimed at linking symbolic values to products. Thus, though we do not refer to them, we constantly keep in mind marketing communications such as wordof-mouth and viral marketing, product placements, events and sponsorships, which are suitable vehicles for linking products with symbolic values.
We will now turn to the question: what is personal autonomy? We distinguish between autonomous agency and the state of being autonomous.
Fundamental to our account of autonomous agency is the powerful idea that acting freely is a question of acting in accordance with and because of one's own will or motivations. However, taken without qualifications, this basic idea is flawed because, in some cases, it allows persons acting on compulsions to be characterized as acting autonomously. For example, a drug addict could be said to act autonomously insofar as he or she wants the drugs and takes them exactly because of this want (Frankfurt, 1971; Lippert-Rasmussen, 2002) .
One solution to the problem is to distinguish between various kinds of motivational elements or, put differently, to distinguish between a person's effective or immediate desires as opposed to his or her more fundamental ones. One way of doing so is to follow the lines of Frankfurt (1971) and introduce a distinction between first-and second-order desires, where a first-order desire expresses ''what one wants'' and a second-order desire expresses ''what one wants to want.'' Against this qualification we hold that a person acts autonomously to the extent that his or her effective first-order desires match his or her more fundamental second-order ones.
Assuming that the aforementioned drug addict has a second-order desire not to take drugs, but that his first-order desire to take them is the stronger one, we can reasonably make the claim that he is acting against his own will and, therefore, not acting autonomously. (We elaborate on this account of autonomy in the section ''How convergent marketing reinforces autonomy.'')
The concept of autonomous agency can also be illustrated similar to this: As Ted passes the bakery, a desire for a doughnut arises (first-order desire). However, Ted is concerned about his health; he believes that doughnuts are unhealthy, and, thus, he also wants not to buy a doughnut (second-order desire). Ted experiences a will-conflict. Our core idea of autonomous action holds that, if Ted's desire not to eat the doughnut is mostly important to him (i.e., if it is of the second-order) then he acts autonomously to the extent that he defeats his desire (of the first order) to buy the doughnut. And vice versa.
One challenge, some times referred to as the ''source problem '' (Lippert-Rasmussen, 2002 ), needs to be addressed. If a person acts on a fundamental second-order desire, which is acquired through some form of manipulation, say powerful marketing, he or she should not be said to act autonomously even though the effective first-order desire or motivation flows from the more fundamental second-order one (Wolf, 1990) . Our answer to this very strong objection is twofold.
First, the objection assumes that the ability to form one's desires independently of external influences is a requirement of autonomous agency. As Crisp (1987) notes, this requirement is certainly too strong because it is hardly believable that any of our actions flow from motivations that are totally in the control of our will and insensitive to external influences (e.g., socio-cultural determinants).
Second, the distinction between ''identification'' and ''alienation'' makes a difference as to whether or not acting on a manipulated desire counts as autonomous agency. The rationale is that an agent acting on a desire with which he or she identifies is acting wholeheartedly and, therefore, could not be said to act involuntary. Moreover, since none of our desires are formed independently of external influences, identification seems to be a reasonable criterion of autonomous agency (Frankfurt, 1988a, b; Lippert-Rasmussen, 2002) . Accordingly, we suggest that an action flowing from an induced second-order desire is autonomous to the extent that the agent identifies with that second-order desire. Now let us focus on the notion of being autonomous. On a coherentist account of autonomy, a person is autonomous to the extent that he or she assesses his or her fundamental desires and beliefs and endorses them in light of critical reflection (Buss, 2008) . Autonomy, then, is a matter of a person's desires and beliefs being consistent with his or her reflective reasoning.
However, as was the case with the account of free agency outlined above, a strict coherentist account of being autonomous gives rise to the source problem, because induced desires might very well cohere with a fair deal of ones desires, beliefs and valueseven on critical reflection.
Most philosophers tend to hold that the requirements for being an autonomous person are stronger than the requirements for autonomous agency. Thus, identification is not a sufficient test, and we have to look for another solution. What is sometimes dubbed responsiveness-to-reason account of autonomy provides a strong answer to the source problem associated with the coherentist view of autonomy.
Roughly put, the responsiveness-to-reason account holds that an agent is autonomous if he or she 520
Thomas Boysen Anker et al.
